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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Wayne Roller appeals from the judgment of the district court entered
upon his guilty plea to Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property. On appeal Roller
argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In August of 2015 Officer Churchfield investigated the theft of a Harley Buell
motorcycle from inside a shop in Emmet. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 – p. 14, L. 13.) Roller
was a suspect. (Id.) After the burglary, the police saw Roller with a Harley Buell
motorcycle. (Id.) Further, during his investigation Officer Churchfield was able to tie
some other items stolen from the shop to Roller. (Id.) However, Roller was not charged
and the case remained open. (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-23.)
In August of 2016 Officer Churchfield was on duty at night and saw a little
maroon Ford Ranger pickup truck that was parked “kind of over by itself” in the WalMart parking lot. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 14, L. 14 – p. 15, L. 18.) Officer Churchfield ran the
license plate. (Id.) The last name matched the last name of someone with an outstanding
warrant. (Id.) Officer Churchfield was familiar with the person sought for the warrant,
and he believed the registered owner of the pickup truck was a relative of that person.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 1.)
When Officer Churchfield walked up to the parked pickup truck he saw a black
motorcycle in the back. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 23 – p. 16, L. 17.) The motorcycle was
half covered with a tarp. (Id.) Officer Churchfield saw Roller inside the cab of the
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pickup truck. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 17, L. 2 – p. 18, L. 2.) Roller appeared to be asleep. (Id.)
Officer Churchfield suspected the motorcycle in the back of the pickup truck was the
same one that had been stolen and linked to Roller. (Id.)
Officer Churchfield took a photograph of the VIN number of the Harley Buell.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-25.) The VIN was in plain view and he did not move or
manipulate the tarp in order to obtain the photograph. (Id.) The last six numbers of the
VIN matched the VIN of the stolen motorcycle. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1-17.) Officer
Churchfield confirmed that the motorcycle was still listed as stolen.

(Id.)

Officer

Churchfield then made contact with Roller and detained him on suspicion of possession
of stolen property. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 18 – p. 20, L. 6.) The state charged Roller with
Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property. (R., pp. 30-31.)
Roller filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the stolen motorcycle. (R. pp.
68-76.) Roller argued that Officer Churchfield’s warrantless search of the vehicle was
unconstitutional because it did not fall into a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. (Id.) The state responded. (R., pp. 86-92.) At the suppression hearing,
Officer Churchfield testified and the body camera video was admitted into evidence.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 21, L. 17 – p. 22, L. 14; Ex. 1. 1)
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Exhibit 1 consists of four video recordings taken from Officer Churchfield’s body
camera. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 21, L. 12 – p. 23, L. 16; Ex. 1.) For the purposes of this appeal,
and for ease of reference, when citing to Exhibit 1, the Respondent will designate which
of the four videos is being cited in the following manner: “AXON_Flex_Video_2016-0822_0444_Churchfield
1.mp4”
will
be
cited
to
as
“Exhibit
1.1”;
“AXON_Flex_Video_2016-08-22_0444_Churchfield 2.mp4” will be cited to as “Exhibit
1.2”; “AXON_Flex_Video_2016-08-22_0444_Churchfield 3.mp4” will be cited to as
“Exhibit 1.3”; and “AXON_Flex_Video_2016-08-22_0444_Churchfield 4.mp4” will be
cited to as “Exhibit 1.4.”
2

The district court denied the motion to suppress. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 49, L. 6. – p. 57,
L. 13.) The district court found that the motorcycle’s VIN number was in plain view and,
thus, the discovery of the VIN number was not an unconstitutional search. (Id.) In the
alternative, the district court also found that any search would have been authorized under
the automobile exception because, based in part on his prior investigation, Officer
Churchfield had probable cause to believe that there could be stolen property in the bed of
the truck. (Id.)
Roller pled guilty and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R., pp. 106-109.) The district court entered a judgment of conviction for
Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property and sentenced Roller to eight years with
two years fixed. (R., pp. 120-126.) The district court suspended the sentence and placed
Roller on probation. (Id.) Roller timely appealed. (R., pp. 127-130.)
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ISSUE
Roller states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Roller’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Roller failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Roller’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Officer Churchfield, and other officers, observed the VIN number of the stolen

motorcycle in plain view. The VIN number was not obscured by the tarp. Even if the
observation of the VIN number constituted a search, that search was authorized under the
automobile exception because Officer Churchfield had probable cause to believe that the
motorcycle in the bed of the truck was stolen. The district court did not err.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this appellate court

applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328
(2012) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). This
appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous but will freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Roller’s Motion To Suppress On Two
Grounds
Officer Churchfield took photographs of the VIN number of the Harley Buell.

(8/7/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-25; see also Ex. 1.2 at 0:36 to 1:29.) The VIN was in plain view
and he did not move or manipulate the tarp in order to obtain the photographs. (Id.)
Another officer present on scene could also see the VIN by shining his light on the
motorcycle. (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 24 – p. 55, L. 4; see also Ex. 1.2 at 01:36 to 4:25.)
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The district court denied Roller’s motion to suppress. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 49, L. 6. – p.
57, L. 13.) The district court found that the motorcycle’s VIN number was not obscured
by the tarp and was in plain view. (See id.) The district court alternatively held that the
search was lawful under the automobile expectation because, based in part on his prior
investigation, Officer Churchfield had probable cause to believe there was a stolen
motorcycle in the bed of the pickup truck. (See id.)
On appeal Roller argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that
Officer Churchfield obtained the VIN number from the first photograph and that he
actually obtained the VIN number from the second photograph. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-11.) Roller goes on to argue that the VIN number, as depicted in the second
photograph, was not in “plain view.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-20.) Roller also
argues that the district court erred when it found Officer Churchfield had probable cause
to search pursuant to the automobile exception. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.)
Roller’s arguments are not supported by the record or the law.

1.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Determined The VIN Number
Was In Plain View

Roller’s first argument is a red herring. Both the first and the second photographs
were taken from a “plain view” vantage point; therefore it does not matter if the district
court determined that the VIN number came from the first or second photograph. It is
also a red herring because the district court also found that the camera was not critical to
seeing the VIN number “because the other officer can clearly see it just by shining his
light on it.” (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 24 – p. 55, L. 4.) Regardless, the district court did
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not err when it denied Roller’s motion to suppress because the VIN number of the
motorcycle was visible in plain view.
“‘The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.

The Fourth

Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely
proscribes those which are unreasonable.’” State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265, 371 P.3d
316, 319 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).

Thus,

suppression is only warranted where the search or seizure is constitutionally
unreasonable. Id.; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quotations,
citations and ellipses omitted) (“Suppression of evidence has always been our last resort,
not our first impulse” because application of the exclusionary rule is only warranted
“where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial societal costs.”); State v. Loman,
153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted) (recognizing
that although warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, the presumption may
be overcome “if the search falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances”).
“Under the open view doctrine, a police officer’s observations made from a
location open to the public do not constitute a search. This is because one cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in what is knowingly exposed to public view.” State v.
Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 (1998) (citations omitted). “[T]here
is no cognizable privacy right in the portion of a vehicle’s interior that can be viewed
from the outside by either ‘inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers’ and ... an
officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle does not raise
the observation to the level of a search.” State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401, 162 P.3d
7

776, 780 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983); State v.
Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126, 130 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Ramirez, 121
Idaho 319, 322, 824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 23-24,
435 P.2d 797, 800-801 (1967)).
The district court first determined that the motorcycle was only partially covered,
and there was no expectation of privacy in the areas of the motorcycle that were not
completely covered by the tarp:
In the video it is obvious, whether or not you know anything about
motorcycles or not, that there is a motorcycle that is partially exposed in
the pickup. It is, in fact, partially covered by an opaque tarp that you
cannot see through. But there is no doubt in the Court’s mind upon
reviewing the video that it is in fact a motorcycle.
The officer testified when he approached he could not determine
what kind of motorcycle it was and he admitted that the entire motorcycle
was not covered. A portion of the motorcycle was clearly covered by the
opaque tarp and straps and what appears to be a small rope or cord that
tide [sic] down the motorcycle.
So the Court finds that this expectation of privacy to an open bed
pickup is only to those items that are completely covered. To the extent
they can be seen, there is no expectation of privacy because the pickup is
open and anyone walking by the pickup could see what is in the pickup.
So the next question becomes, with that reduced expectation of
privacy for an open bed pickup, was the VIN number in plain or open
view?
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 51, L. 8 – p. 52, L. 7.)

The district court next considered Officer

Churchfield’s use of a flashlight, and determined that it was not intrusive. (See 8/7/17
Tr., p. 52, L. 8 – p. 53, L. 22.) The district court then considered the use of the camera
and found that, after watching the video “numerous” times, it did not see Officer
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Churchfield move the tarp to take the pictures, and at most his hand “hit” a tiny rope
while taking the pictures:
So now we come to the use of the camera and the flashlight and
whether or not the tarp was moved. The Court watched this video
numerous times, the four files on Exhibit 1. And it is not obvious to the
Court that the tarp was moved or that the straps were moved. The Court
did see where it’s at least arguable, although inconclusive from the video,
on whether or not a tiny rope was moved that may have been securing the
motorcycle. But there is no movement of that tiny rope in order to get a
clear picture. His hand may have hit the tiny rope in taking the picture, but
it’s not like the rope is moved so you can see the VIN number.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 53, L. 23 – p. 54, L. 11.)
Importantly the district court found that Officer Churchfield did not have to move
the “tiny rope” to take the picture of the VIN number. (Id.) The district court also found
that the use of the camera was not critical to discovering the VIN number because the
second officer could see the VIN number just by shining a light on it. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 54,
L. 16 – p. 55, L. 4 (“So the use of the camera is not critical to discovering the VIN
number because the other officer can clearly see it just by shining his light on it.”); see
also Ex. 1.2 at 1:40 to 4:14.)
Thus, if the use of the camera was not critical to whether the VIN number was in
plain view it is irrelevant if it was the first or second photograph that Officer Churchfield
utilized. Further, even if it was the second photograph the district court found that
Officer Churchfield did not have to move the “tiny rope” to see the VIN number; thus it
was in plain view regardless if a camera was used.
Roller’s second argument, that Officer Churchfield “engaged in a search by
intruding the constitutionally protected area of the covered truck bed to photograph the
VIN” is unsupported. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-19.) First, as cited above, the district
9

court found that the use of the camera was not necessary to discovering the VIN number
because the other officer could see it just by shining his light on it:
The outcome of this case would be different if the camera is stuck
under the inside of the tarp to get a picture of what clearly the officer could
not see with his own eyesight. But that is not the case here. Here, the use
of the technology, the use of the camera, is simply capturing what the
officer can see with his own eyesight.
The second officer to the right of Officer Churchfield comes in,
shines the light on the VIN number and writes it down. So the use of the
camera is not critical to discovering the VIN number because the other
officer can clearly see it just by shining his light on it.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 16 – p. 55, L. 4.)
Roller’s argument is dependent upon the expectation of privacy in areas of the
motorcycle covered by the tarp. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.) Roller argues he had
an expectation of privacy in the tarp covered areas of the motorcycle and the officers
violated this expectation of privacy. (See id.) This argument is not supported by the
record. Reviewing the body camera footage, as the district court did “numerous” times, it
is clear the officers did not move the tarp or otherwise observe anything that was hidden
from plain view by the tarp. (See Ex. 1.2 at 0:36 to 4:15.) They walked around the bed
of the truck and did not move the tarp or otherwise interfere with the motorcycle in the
bed of the truck. (See id.) As a result, the officers only observed items (the exposed parts
of the motorcycle) in which Roller does not claim a privacy interest. “Only if the officer
has gained a view of the items as the direct result of an intrusion into a place where a
privacy interest exists must the officer justify the intrusion as a lawful police activity.”
Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 322, 824 P.2d at 897 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736737 (1983); State v. Tamez, 116 Idaho 945, 782 P.2d 353 (1989)). There was no
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expectation of privacy in the non-tarp covered parts of the motorcycle and, thus, the
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by observing the VIN number in plain
view.

2.

If Looking At The VIN Number Of The Stolen Motorcycle Constituted A
Search That Search Was Authorized Under The Automobile Exception

Officer Churchfield, and the other officers, observed the VIN number of the stolen
motorcycle in plain view, and thus there was not a search. However, if looking at the
VIN number was a search, that search was authorized under the automobile exception.
The district court made an alternative holding and determined that a search of the VIN
number was authorized under the automobile exception because Officer Churchfield had
probable cause, due to his prior investigation, to believe the motorcycle in the back of the
truck could have been stolen. (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 55, L. 24 – p. 56, L. 17.) On appeal,
Roller argues that Officer Churchfield did not have probable cause to believe the
motorcycle was stolen. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.) The record supports the
district court’s finding of probable cause and the automobile exception applies.
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable
cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may
search the automobile without a warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d
210, 212 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); State
v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 897-898, 821 P.2d 949, 952-953 (1991); State v. Johnson,
152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,
120, 266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237
P.3d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010)).
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“Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at the time of the search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328 (2012). “Probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that
incriminating evidence is present is all that is required.” Id. (citing Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). If probable cause exists to believe a vehicle contains evidence of
criminal activity, the search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be
found is authorized. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 61, 266 P.3d at 1166 (citing United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)). “The permissible scope of a warrantless automobile
search ‘is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe it will be found.’” State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 427, 361 P.3d 1280,
1290 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
Here the district court found that Officer Churchfield, based upon his prior
investigation, had probable cause to believe there was a stolen item in the bed of Roller’s
truck:
Alternatively, as to the automobile exception, that would be a
secondary basis for finding that the search was not in violation of the
Idaho or United States Constitution. The officer specifically testified that
the vehicle was capable of leaving and that there was probable cause for
believing that there was a stolen item in the bed of the vehicle based on his
prior investigation. The Court is mindful that the prior investigation
occurred approximately a year prior to this event when he worked for the
Gem County sheriff’s office, but the officer had no facts to suggest that
that investigation of the stolen motorcycle and other property in Gem
County had ever been resolved and was acting on a good-faith basis that
there was a likelihood based on the identity of the driver and the
motorcycle that there could be contraband or possession of stolen property
in this case.
12

(8/7/17 Tr., p. 55, L. 24 – p. 56, L. 17.) The district court did not err. A year prior,
Officer Churchfield had investigated the theft of a Harley Buell motorcycle from inside a
shop in Emmet. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 – p. 14, L. 13.) During that investigation Roller
emerged as a suspect. (Id.) Officer Churchfield had information that, after the burglary,
Roller had been seen with a Harley Buell motorcycle. (Id.) Officer Churchfield searched
a building that Roller was working on and found property belonging to the owner of the
burglarized shop at the building site.

(Id.)

Officer Churchfield also found items

belonging to Roller in the same box as items missing from the shop that was burglarized.
(Id.) Officer Churchfield testified:
Q. BY [PROSECUTOR]: Go ahead. Can you answer that question?
A. So during the course of the investigation a sergeant with the Emmett
Police Department had seen and told me he saw [Roller] with a Buell.
Also, the building he was working on, I had searched through that building
and found some property that belonged to the owner of the shop that was
burglarized. So we linked that stuff to [Roller].
Q. How did you link that to Michael?
A. Well, for one thing, there were two keys found in the box of stuff that
had items that were his, the victim’s. And in that was also a couple of BiMart cards and one of the Bi-Mart cards came back to [Roller].
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 5-20.) During the investigation Officer Churchfield tried to talk to
Roller, but he was not cooperative and did not want to talk to him. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 13, L.
21 – p. 14, L. 3.) To the best of Officer Churchfield’s knowledge, Harley Buells are not
common motorcycles in Emmet. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 4-5.) Roller was not charged and
the case remained open. (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-23.)
When Officer Churchfield walked up to the parked pickup truck he saw a
motorcycle in the back and it looked like a Harley Buell. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 23 – p.
13

16, L. 17.) The motorcycle was half covered with a tarp. (Id.) Officer Churchfield saw
Roller inside the cab of the pickup truck. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 17, L. 2 – p. 18, L. 2.) Roller
appeared to be asleep. (Id.) Officer Churchfield suspected the Harley Buell in the back
of the pickup truck was the same one that had been previously stolen and linked to Roller.
(Id.)
Q. Did you at this time suspect the motorcycle in the back might have been
the black Buell?
A. Yes.
Q. And why is that?
A. [Roller] was in the front seat; I have a bike in the back that definitely
could be a Buell, from what I know of bikes; it is covered with a tarp;
parked off by itself. There’s a lot of things right there.
(8/7/17 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 15-24.)
Roller argues that because the investigation was a year old and Officer
Churchfield could not conclusively determine if the motorcycle under the tarp was a
Harley Buell, he did not have probable cause to believe there was a stolen motorcycle in
the bed of the truck. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.) The district court did not err because
it did consider the length of time between the investigation and the discovery of the
motorcycle. (8/7/17 Tr., p. 55, L. 24 – p. 56, L. 17.) Further, while Officer Churchfield
could not conclusively determine it was a Buell partially under the tarp, it did match the
shape of the Buell. (See 8/7/17 Tr., p. 26, L. 21 – p. 29, L. 12.) However, as cited above,
probable cause is established, when under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that evidence of crime will be found in a particular place. It is a flexible,
common sense standard. And the search is limited to where the evidence might be found.
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Here, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Churchfield had linked Roller to the
theft of a motorcycle. Now he found Roller, his prime suspect, asleep in a truck, with a
partially hidden motorcycle in the bed of the truck. That partially hidden motorcycle
matched the shape of the stolen motorcycle. Officer Churchfield had probable cause to
conduct a limited search to determine if that motorcycle was evidence of a crime. Officer
Churchfield, and the other officers, looked at the VIN number and determined this was
the stolen motorcycle. Even if this constituted a search, that search was authorized by the
automobile exception and the district court properly denied Roller’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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